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Abstract
Background: Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has affected the world in an unprecedented manner and South Asian
countries were among the first to experience imported cases. Pakistan’s response to COVID-19 has been under scrutiny
for its granularity, reach and impact.
Aims: to evaluate objectively the chronology and depth of the response to COVID-19 in Pakistan.
Methods: We evaluated available national and subnational epidemiological and burden information on COVID-19 cases
and deaths in Pakistan, including projection models available to the Government at an early stage of the pandemic.
Results: Pakistan, with a population of 215 million and considerable geographic diversity, experienced case introduction from pilgrims returning from the Islamic Republic of Iran, followed by widespread community transmission. The
National Command and Operations Centre, established through civilian and military partnership, was critical in fast
tracking logistics, information gathering, real-time reporting and smart lockdowns, coupled with a massive cash support
programme targeting the poorest sections of society. Cases peaked in June 2020 but the health system was able to cope
with the excess workload. Since then, although testing rates remain low (> 300 000 cases confirmed to date), case fatality
rates have stabilized, and with 6300 deaths, Pakistan seems to have flattened the COVID-19 curve.
Conclusion: Despite notable successes in controlling the pandemic, several weaknesses remain and there are risks of
rebound as the economy and educational systems reopen. There is continued need for strong technical and programmatic
oversight, linked to civic society engagement and working with religious scholars to ensure nonpharmacological intervention compliance.
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Introduction
The world has witnessed an 18 month period like no
other. From the early reports of a new disease caused
by a possible coronavirus, subsequently confirmed to be
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARSCoV)-2, the outbreak became an epidemic with clear
global risks. The resultant infection, called coronavirus
disease 2019 (COVID-19), was declared a global pandemic
on 11 March 2020 (1). Over the last 18 months, COVID-19
has spread across the globe and led to > 196 million infections and 4.2 million deaths (2). The disease continues
to baffle epidemiologists and public health professionals
across much of the developed world, with huge impacts
on the economic, trade, commercial and public health
outcomes. Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)
are no exception, and many have also suffered outbreaks
with huge loss of life and economic disruptions.

imity to China, where the outbreak originated, and the
Islamic Republic of Iran, one of the first major outbreak
epicentres outside Europe. While the initial focus was on
inbound travellers from China, this was rapidly readjusted towards suspected cases among pilgrims returning by
road from holy sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unlike structured airport entries, the Iranian border crossing in the remote location of Taftan in Balochistan Province meant that initial arrangements were inadequate
and makeshift facilities for screening and quarantine
had to be established. The disease quickly spread to all
metropolitan centres and districts of Pakistan, although
several rural districts of Balochistan and Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province had comparatively lower reported numbers of cases and negligible reported deaths.
However, this was likely related to limited testing at population level (Figure 1).

Early disease introduction and
epidemiology in Pakistan

What guided national policy and early
multisectoral responses?

Pakistan experienced early introduction of COVID-19 in
February 2020. This was not surprising given its prox-

Health sector limitations in developing a comprehensive
strategy for response became evident soon after identifi-
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<caption>Figure 1. Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) morbidity and mortality
distribution
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in Pakistan in March–September 2020.

Figure 1 Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) morbidity and mortality distribution in Pakistan in March–September 2020

cation of the first group of cases in Sindh among returning pilgrims from holy sites in the Islamic Republic of
Iran on 26 February 2020, as there were negligible public
health laboratories with the capacity and standardized
protocols for real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2 infections. These needed to be
established including a mobile testing laboratory at remote Taftan, alongside quarantine facilities.

NCC for coordination across multiple provinces and
jurisdictions, as well as between entities of the Federal
Government (3). Other notable actions, despite limited
resources, were the inclusion of the National Disaster
Management Authority (NDMA) for emergency
procurement and deployment of a wide range of
resources by the Federal and Provincial Governments.

As the pandemic and its attendant challenges
expanded into nonhealth domains, the initial response,
mainly centred within the Federal Ministry of National
Health Services, Regulation & Coordination (MoNHSRC),
had to be completely redesigned. Formation of the
National Coordinating Council (NCC) on 13 March 2020,
headed by the Prime Minister with representatives
from all key ministries including health, was a key early
step, followed soon by the establishment of a National
Command and Operations Center (NCOC) on 27 March
2. Epidemiological
curve
2020. The <caption>Figure
NCOC was the implementation
arm of the

There was little to guide the national response in the
initial stages, beyond the broad early guidance of the World
Health Organization and the response emerging from
countries in the extreme grip of the pandemic (January
to February 2020). These included China, which after
an initial period of confusion and limited information,
imposed a strict lockdown despite the Chinese New
Year, to restrict movement of its population (4). With the
rapidly changing initial responses from European and
North American countries, the Pakistan Government
imposed a series of early nonpharmacological
and
nonpharmacological
interventions
Pakistan
interventions
(NPIs), including
closure ofineducational

(February–September 2020)

Figure 2 Epidemiological curve and nonpharmacological interventions in Pakistan (February–September 2020)
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<caption>Figure 3. Trends in confirmed cases and coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) deaths
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institutions, bans on large gatherings like weddings, and
closure of some nonessential businesses. Extension to a
full lockdown in the largest city of Karachi followed on 23
March 2020, and a day later in other major metropolitan
areas. These were met by various challenges at different
stages, given planned religious mass gatherings
and traditional practices in the month of Ramadhan
(Figure 2). Notwithstanding these considerations, strict
implementation of movement restrictions and business
closures played a major role in flattening the incidence
curve, and preparing the health sector for the predictable
surge of cases.
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Local epidemiology and policy guidance

Lack of capacity and paucity of national and provincial
public health institutions have affected the rapidity of
obtaining relevant population-based information from
research. The COVID-19 oversight committees established at the federal and provincial level focused initially
on logistics, and only began investing in data systems by
the end of March 2020, reporting directly to the NCOC
and publishing situational analyses on a daily basis on a
public MoNHSRC COVID-19 information portal (5). This
became a vital link for monitoring and trend analysis.
A crucial element was enabling systematic inflow
Capacity and equipment for molecular diagnostics in
of testing data from a constantly increasing number of
public sector laboratories in Pakistan were limited. From
laboratories across the provinces and from public, private
the initial 4 laboratory testing sites in the public sector
and nonprofit sectors. In a remarkable redeployment of
with a maximum daily capacity of 400 PCR tests, stemmed
resources, the existing reporting network and database
several testing sites across the country, established by the
for polio surveillance was used to fast track the process,
<caption>Figure
2. Epidemiological
curve
and nonpharmacological interventions in Pakistan
Federal
Government under
the supervision
of Pakistan’s
and electronic interfaces were created to ensure rapid
National Institute of Health (NIH) by the end of February.
and accurate data flow. It was quickly recognized that
2020)
The(February–September
Federal and Provincial
Governments established
there was little capacity within the existing health
expert committees to address COVID response,
system infrastructure, even in large provincial capitals,
guidelines and regulations. The foci of these oversight
to cope with the anticipated rise in critically ill patients.
groups were development of standard operating
Hence, an essential objective of the initial rapid response
procedures for case detection (establishing testing
strategy was to flatten the epidemiological disease
systems and staff training), and guideline development
curve to allow enough time to build systems’ capacity.
for infection control in various settings as well as clinical
While there were around 2000 intensive care beds in
care of patients with COVID-19. A small think tank was
the country initially, few had the capacity to take care of
set up at the federal level for coordinating efforts and
COVID patients (Table 1). Several health facilities had to be
streamlining procurements, imports and distribution of
revamped and equipped for functionality. The NCOC and
testing kits and equipment, staff training and personal
NDMA played a crucial role in fast tracking procurement
protective equipment (PPE). As Figure 3 indicates,
and local production of key commodities such as PPE and
notwithstanding considerable regional differences in
hand sanitizers. Local manufacturing of ventilators was
rates of testing, overall numbers of confirmed cases per
initiated and by June 2020, Pakistan became largely selfday climbed to a maximum of around 6000–7000 by
reliant on the COVID-19 supply chain and logistics.
mid-June and decreased to the current daily average of
< 500. The number of COVID-19 related deaths, which
Data for decision making
is based on a standardized reporting system from > 500
hospitals across the country, has decreased consistently
Establishing a central, accurate data repository was key
and steadily.
to evidence-informed
decision-making,
<caption>Figure 3. Trends in confirmed cases and coronavirus
disease 2019 (COVID-19)
deaths which was facil-

in Pakistan

Figure 3 Trends in confirmed cases and coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) deaths in Pakistan
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27 706

itated by the Digital Pakistan initiative with a data synthesis system, and the launch of the Pak Nigehban App
(6) to track and localize resources, especially the availability of intensive care unit (ICU) beds and ventilators.

25 610

29 700

30 048

30 048

The Government used 3 different forecasting models
for short- and medium-term decision making but these
were not put in the public space. Alternative models,
including those indicating dynamic disease projection
profiles and duration, were produced by groups at the
University of Toronto (7), Imperial College London (8)
and the Institute of Health Metrics & Evaluation in
Seattle (9), and were disparate in their predicted trends
(Figure 4). The modelling exercise collectively guided
the planning and decision-making at the federal and
provincial level despite a gap in quality data collection
systems; however, a learning curve was observed on both
the demand and supply side of such information. It is
unclear if any of these models drove policy as none were
put up for public debate and scrutiny by the national
scientific community. In fact, given limited testing and
rudimentary data on response systems, many of these
projections were met with scepticism or largely ignored
in favour of real-time reporting of admissions and deaths.
Given widespread scepticism at different stages as to the
exact direction and severity of the pandemic in Pakistan,
and widespread disagreements among various sections
of society, especially the electronic and print media,
medical professional bodies, mainstream political parties
and religious scholars, it took time to develop a national
consensus on approaches and solutions. In hindsight a
national conference and consultative process with civic
society could have avoided much acrimony and led to a
common nonpartisan strategy (10).
Abbreviations: COVID-19 = coronavirus disease 2019; ICU = intensive care unit; PCR = polymerase chain reaction.
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—
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Trained staff in critical
care
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2267
Functional ventilators
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11 140

14 186

30 190
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110
107
99
83
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59
09
Testing centres or
laboratories for PCR
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19
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May 15

May 30
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April 30
April 15
March 30
March 15
March 1

Aspect

Table 1 Chronology of health systems response to COVID-19 in Pakistan

Timeline, 2020

June 15

July 15

July 31

August 31

September 15
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What went well?
Notwithstanding the above and resource constraints,
the Pakistan Government moved with alacrity once the
scale of the disaster in other countries became apparent.
Despite the limited role that the federal MoNHSRC has
following the devolution of health services to the provinces in 2011 (11), the multi-stakeholder response that
it had was able to spearhead and support the national
COVID-19 response. It played a key role in the NCOC
which was chaired by the Federal Minister for Planning
& Development. The NIH rose to the task of training
technicians, procuring testing equipment and boosting
capacities across Pakistan, and daily testing capacity
was enhanced from < 2000 tests daily to a capacity of >
50 000 across the public sector testing sites by August
2020. The NCOC resolved the issues of logistics, supplies
and procurements as a national emergency through the
NDMA ranging from vital PPE, oxygen supply systems
and establishment of COVID-19 care and treatment centres across the country. Pakistan faced a critical shortage
of human resources with < 9500 trained professionals in
critical care at the outset of the pandemic. Virtual training and skills development programmes for staff were
launched by the Aga Khan University, Health Services
801
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(various models as of June 2020)

Figure 4 Projections of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) deaths in Pakistan (various models as of June 2020)

Academy and NIH partnership (12), which has trained >
50 000 staff members to-date.
A remarkable achievement was the establishment of a
central reporting system for data at national and provincial
levels with the ability to provide district-level estimates.
This was real-time reporting and publicly available, in
contrast with many other governments in South Asia. The
establishment of a data flow system made both central
and provincial level response planning possible. This was
supported in due course by the innovative approach to
contact tracing and identification of hotspots with local
response; the so-called smart lockdowns (13). Deliberate
efforts were also made to inform the public about the
virus and to reinforce necessary precautions. All mobile
phones in the country replayed short messages related
to COVID-19 prevention strategies prior to connecting
any phone call as a public service, and numerous social
media campaigns were conducted at a variety of public
and private levels.
To spur private sector investments, the State Bank
of Pakistan Refinance Facility for Combating COVID-19
(SBP-RFCC) provided loans at < 3% interest to hospitals
and medical centres. Funds were meant for COVIDrelated expenses, from expanding/upgrading facilities to
purchasing equipment such as ventilators or enhanced
PPE. More than 6 billion Pakistani rupees (PKR) were
disbursed to 35 hospitals, adding 13 brand new wards, 1112
additional beds and > 350 ventilators.
Pakistan also launched a robust response to the
secondary effects of the sudden lockdown and loss of
income for daily wage earners. A key intervention was
the launch of cash disbursement through an existing
social safety net Ehsaas (which means percipience).
The programme targets female heads of households
with disbursal of PKR 12 000 (US$ 75) allocated for
each of the 12 million potential beneficiaries at risk of
802

extreme financial hardship and food insecurity (14). The
rapid institution of these response strategies as well as
considerable private philanthropy and charitable support
were some of the main reasons that Pakistan did not
witness the tragic exodus of migrant workers and slum
dwellers from the megacities seen elsewhere.
Only time will tell the exact impact on education
systems and learning across the large network of public
sector schools that were forced to close by the end of
March. While private schools and universities were able
to initiate on-line teaching, the same was not possible
for > 200 000 primary, middle and secondary schools in
Pakistan, supporting some 25 million students (15). The
Government launched a television channel (TeleSchool)
dedicated to education on 13 April 2020.
The role of the Prime Minister was notable. Early on,
when restrictions and lockdowns were the mainstay of
response, he spearheaded the Ehsaas programme for cash
assistance, and thereafter took the decision, criticised
by many as a financially risky, to reopen the economy
and move to a strategy of contact tracing and smart
20 lockdowns. This was brave and saved Pakistan from the
tragic consequences of an abrupt and prolonged closure of
the economy. The same decision, after much deliberation,
to reopen schools and educational institutions by 15
September 2020 is reflective of actions by NCOC and the
political leadership on firm risk–benefit analysis.

What did not work?
Despite the achievements listed above, there were several
levels of COVID-19 response in Pakistan that could have
gone better (16). The numbers of tests achieved at population level remained a fraction of the desirable numbers, with considerable diversity across the country. The
numbers tested in Islamabad Capital Territories were
higher (124 888 tests per million population) than those
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achieved in the provinces, especially Baluchistan (5955
tests per million population) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(7271 tests per million population), and the latter numbers
appear to have gone down further in recent weeks. As of
30 July 2021, documented COVID-19 deaths in Pakistan
are around 23 209 overall (~1 021 000 confirmed cases),
these likely underestimate the true picture given the testing level. However, it is unlikely that large-scale excess
population mortality has been missed, given that burials
are universal and with the limited numbers of burial sites
across the country, any excess would have been evident.
This was also queried in the larger cities with no evidence
of excess deaths in comparable time periods.
With some disagreements on the nature of response
and strictness of the lockdown, mixed messages led to
unnecessary acrimony and discord, and polarization of
opinions between political parties. This compounded
confusion at the level of civic society with large-scale
breakdown of physical distancing by the end of Ramadhan
(late May 2020), a judicial order to reopen businesses (18),
and the predictable upsurge in cases across the board in
June.
Lack of consensus among religious scholars on the
nature of restrictions and measures needed for Friday
communal prayers forced some local governments to
impose lockdowns covering Friday prayer times. Over
time, this discord has settled and the most recent festival
of Eid-ul-Adha and religious congregations during the
month of Moharram did not see widespread flaunting
of rules and crowding of public places. However,
communication strategies and community buy-in for
preventive measures such as use of face masks and
physical distancing remain an issue, compounded by
stigmatization of some households once identified by
the smart-lockdown process. This risks engagement,
reporting and hence tracking of hot spots or clusters.
Premature celebration of the “victory” over COVID-19 and
reduced compliance of mask use and physical distancing
are major risk factors for resurgence of COVID-19, as
was seen in the national Independence Day celebrations
on 14 August or in some schools after reopening on 15
September 2020.

What lies ahead?
Compared with many, including neighbouring countries, Pakistan appears to have “dodged the bullet” and
blunted the feared effects of COVID-19. The overall cases
and fatalities are significantly lower than in its eastern
and western neighbours, although within the predicted
range suggested by mitigation strategies in April 2020
(7). Apart from the contribution of the Government’s response detailed above, a range of factors have been cited. These include a young population (almost half are
aged < 20 years); cultural practices that restrict social
networking for families outside their immediate families; and possible innate immunity with prior exposure
to other coronaviruses (19). Two recent population-based
serological surveys in Islamabad and Karachi suggested
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that between 14% and 28% of the population has antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 (AI and ZAB, personal communication
2020). However, given the unpredictability of the virus
and the dreaded resurgence anticipated later this year, it
is important to maintain strict compliance with preventive strategies. As has been seen in other better-resourced
countries, such as the United States of America and Australia, periods of low circulation and disease burden can
be followed by rapid upsurges and spread. The future
in a COVID-19 era could depend on the objective analysis of the past experience and identification of possible
trigger points for imposition/withdrawing of NPIs while
the new cases continue to rise and fall in a population.
Pakistan utilized the polio surveillance programme to
monitor and track COVID-19. This must be replaced by a
robust surveillance and disease warning system.
Pakistan has now reopened some of its schools,
given the need to address the emerging learning gap
(20). This re-entry of 53.4 million students and staff into
group educational activities must be done in a careful,
measured manner, with potential innovations to reduce
exposure, such as shift systems for classes and almost
universal use of face masks and hand hygiene. The
interruption of primary healthcare services for women,
children and elderly people has been massive. By most
accounts, immunization rates among vulnerable children
dropped precipitously as did most preventive services
such as nutritional support programmes. These are
being reinstituted rapidly and safely. Pakistan was able to
relaunch its polio immunization campaign successfully
in late July 2020 without any reports of health risks or
COVID-19 exposure among vaccinators. The primary care
programme with community-based lady health workers
is beginning to restart its work in community education
and identification of at-risk families, contributing to
routine surveillance and nutritional support programmes
(21).
As in any emergency response, after the “adrenaline
surge” comes a period of exhaustion and the COVID-19
response has been no different. Frontline workers,
managers and support staff have been working on an
emergency footing for almost 18 months and by now
predictable battle fatigue is setting in. Health workers
have borne a disproportionate burden of exposure,
infections and deaths in Pakistan but morale remains
high.
It is imperative, however, that all learn to live
with the virus and its unpredictability. That means a
gradual reopening of the economy and learning the
“new normal”; the latter could be that the virus might
continue to coexist for several years and have periodic
upsurges. The vaccine pipeline for COVID-19 is busy
and apart from effectiveness, many questions remain as
to its eventual equitable distribution and availability in
LMICs. Cash and Patel (22) rightly emphasize the need
for contextual responses and strategies that are fit for
resource-constrained LMICs. Pakistan is an example
where the national public health response was based
on a blend of global guidance but with pragmatic local
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adaptation. While the Government may have taken
risks in its response, the evidence to date suggests that
it has worked, and with the right follow-up and care, the
response could serve as an example for others to follow.
For a country of 215 million people, to achieve the current

stable status for an investment of under $0.5 billion (23),
is a remarkable feat but not happenstance.
Funding: Core support from the Institute for Global
Health & Development, Aga Khan University.
Competing interests: None declared.

Trouver le bon équilibre entre science et politique publique dans la riposte à la
COVID-19 au Pakistan
Résumé
Contexte : La maladie à coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) a touché le monde d'une manière sans précédent et les pays
d'Asie du Sud ont été parmi les premiers à connaître des cas importés. La riposte à la COVID-19 au Pakistan a été
examinée de près en raison de sa granularité, de sa portée et de son impact.
Objectifs : La présente étude vise à évaluer d’une manière objective la chronologie et la profondeur de la riposte à la
COVID-19 au Pakistan.
Méthodes : Nous avons évalué les informations épidémiologiques et relatives à la charge de morbidité disponibles
aux niveaux national et infranational sur les cas et les décès liés à la COVID-19 au Pakistan, y compris les modèles de
projection disponibles pour le gouvernement à un stade précoce de la pandémie.
Résultats : Avec une population de 215 millions d'habitants et une diversité géographique considérable, le Pakistan
a connu une introduction de cas à partir de pèlerins revenant de la République islamique d'Iran, suivie d'une large
transmission communautaire. Le National Command and Operations Centre, établi par un partenariat civil et militaire,
a joué un rôle crucial dans le suivi logistique rapide, la collecte des informations, l'établissement de rapports en
temps réel ainsi que la mise en place des confinements efficaces, avec un programme de soutien financier ciblant
les endroits les plus pauvres de la société. Le nombre de cas a atteint un niveau record en juin 2020, mais le système
de santé a pu faire face à la surcharge de travail. Depuis lors, bien que les taux de dépistage restent faibles (plus de
300 000 cas confirmés à ce jour), le taux de létalité s’est stabilisé et, avec 6300 décès, le Pakistan semble avoir connu
un aplatissement de la courbe des cas de COVID-19.
Conclusion : Malgré les progrès notables réalisés dans la lutte contre la pandémie, plusieurs faiblesses demeurent et
il existe des risques de rebond avec la réouverture de l'économie et des systèmes éducatifs. Il est toujours nécessaire
d'assurer une supervision technique et programmatique solide, liée à l'engagement de la société civile et à la
collaboration avec les personnalités religieuses pour garantir le respect des interventions non pharmacologiques.

 يف باكستان19-التوازن بني العلم والسياسة العامة يف إطار االستجابة لكوفيد
 حممد إسالم، أسعد حفيظ، عادل حيدر، عامر إكرام، فيصل سلطان،ذو الفقار هبوتا

اخلالصة

 وكانت بلدان جنوب آسيا من أوائل البلدان،) خمتلف أنحاء العامل عىل نح ٍو غري مسبوق19- (كوفيد2019  رضبت جائحة فريوس كورونا:اخللفية
. للوقوف عىل تفاصيل تلك االستجابة ونطاقها وتأثريها19- وأجرينا دراسة تدقيقية الستجابة باكستان لكوفيد.التي شهدت حاالت وافدة
. وعمق تلك االستجابة يف باكستان19- هدفت هذه الدراسة اىل إجراء تقييم موضوعي للتسلسل الزمني لالستجابة ملرض كوفيد:األهداف

ً  أجرينا:ُطرق البحث
املستويي الوطني ودون الوطني بشأن حاالت
تقييم للمعلومات الوبائية واملعلومات املتعلقة بعبء املرض املتاحة عىل
ْ
. ومن بينها نامذج التو ُّقع املتاحة للحكومة يف مرحلة مبكرة من اجلائحة، والوفيات النامجة عن املرض يف باكستان19-كوفيد
 من احلجاج العائدين من19- وفادة حاالت كوفيد، مليون نسمة وتتمتع بتنوع جغرايف كبري215  التي يبلغ عدد سكاهنا، شهدت باكستان:النتائج
 الذي ُأنشئ من خالل رشاكة، واضطلع املركز الوطني للقيادة والعمليات. وأعقب ذلك رساية جمتمعية واسعة النطاق،مجهورية إيران اإلسالمية
ُّ
 إىل جانب تنفيذ، وحظر اخلروج الذكي، واإلبالغ اآلين، ومجع املعلومات،التعقب الرسيع
 بدور بالغ األمهية يف لوجستيات،مدنية وعسكرية
َّ  ولكن النظام الصحي،2020 حزيران/  وبلغت احلاالت ذروهتا يف يونيو.برنامج دعم نقدي واسع النطاق يستهدف أفقر رشائح املجتمع
متكن من
َّ  حالة300000  ورغم أن معدالت االختبار ال تزال منخفضة (أكثر من، ومنذ ذلك احلني.مواجهة عبء العمل الزائد
 استقرت،)مؤكدة حتى اآلن
َّ  ويبدو أن باكستان،معدالت الوفيات بني احلاالت
. حالة6300  إذ بلغ عدد حاالت الوفاة،19-سطحت منحنى كوفيد

 وهناك خماطر بحدوث ارتداد مع إعادة، ال تزال هناك عدة مواطن ضعف، عىل الرغم من النجاحات امللحوظة يف مكافحة اجلائحة:االستنتاجات
 والعمل مع علامء الدين، مع ربط ذلك بمشاركة املجتمع املدين، و َث َّمة حاجة مستمرة إىل مراقبة تقنية وبرجمية قوية.فتح االقتصاد وال ُّن ُظم التعليمية
.لضامن االمتثال للتدخل غري الدوائي
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